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The Dolev-Yao model has been widely used in protocol ver-
ification and has been implemented in many protocol veri-
fiers. There are strong assumptions underlying this model,
such as perfect cryptography: the aim of the present work is
to propose an approach to weaken this hypothesis, by means
of probabilistic considerations on the strength of crypto-
graphic functions. Such an approach may effectively be im-
plemented in actual protocol verifiers. The Yahalom proto-
col is used as an easy example to show this approach.
Categories and Subject Descriptors





Nowadays protocol verification is mainstream in computer
science. Adequate tool support has been a key aspect that
has brought this about, as it made protocol verification tech-
niques available to the protocol development community.
Protocol verification can be approached from a compu-
tational point of view, trying to take into account the com-
plexity of the algorithms used in cryptography: this borrows
ideas from complexity theory and tries to estimate from a
quantitative point of view the strength of a protocol.
Another possible approach to the problem is represented
by formal methods. This verifies the overall correctness of
the protocol, without taking into account computational as-
pects. A well-known example of weaknesses uncovered by
using formal methods is the Needham-Schroeder protocol:
dating back to 1978, it was considered a secure protocol
until 1995, when Lowe discovered an attack by using for-
mal methods — now the corrected version of the protocol is
known as Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [11, 10].
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The latter approach has been mechanized by means of a
variety of tools, such as ProVerif [1, 7] or AVISPA just to
name a few.
Research is slowly moving in the direction of merging the
two approaches, introducing some probabilistic and compu-
tational considerations to evaluate how likely it is for an
attack to be performed successfully. The aim of the present
work is to propose a methodology to exploit currently avail-
able tools to evaluate the probability of a successful attack
on a protocol.
2. THE DOLEV-YAOMODEL
The Dolev-Yao model (sketched in figure 1) dates back to
1983 and it is still widely used in protocol verification [8].
In this model the net is seen as a star, where the attacker
is in the central node: in this way every communication
is mediated by the attacker, who can decide to twist the
messages, to prevent them from getting to their intended
recipient or to deliver them unchanged.
What the attacker cannot do is to break cryptographic
functions, as they are assumed to be perfect. This means
that a cyphered message can be decrypted only with the
appropriate key or that a hashing function is collision-free.
The size of messages, keys and of any other term is irrele-
vant: this allows us to reason about the protocol abstracting
from the actual implementations, as issues like overflows, dif-
ferent strength of keys, channel capacity and so on are not
taken into account. This is useful, because the flaws that
may eventually be found depend on the protocol, and not
on the particular implementation of it.
Finally in the run of the protocol any number of partici-
pants is admitted: this means that there can be any number
of parallel sessions that may interact.
3. VARIATIONS ON THE MODEL
The scenario depicted in the Dolev-Yao model is a highly
idealized one: it can be effectively implemented in protocol
verifiers, but it is somehow far from the reality of things, as
it relies on strong assumptions.
For this reason variations on the Dolev-Yao model have
been proposed: for example a transition system with com-
putation times has been proposed in [6]. In this transition
system each transition stands for a computation and is la-
beled with a function that relates the computation with its
cost: the weight function returns a non-negative real num-
ber or infinity (in case of impossible computations). The
use of this framework allows us to evaluate the feasibility of
an attack. Later on in [6] the assumption that computation
Figure 1: The Dolev-Yao model.
times are deterministic is removed and we have probabilistic
computation times that label the transitions.
A probabilistic polynomial time process calculus has been
proposed in [13]. In this process calculus, very similar to the
pi-calculus by Milner [12] and to the SPI-calculus by Gordon
and Abadi [4], polynomials are associated to terms: as the
aim of this process calculus is to account for probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries, this calculus must be able to
express some information about the width of a channel or
about the number of feasible replications of a process. This
results in a complicated semantics.
Similar ideas are expressed in [14, 15], where the authors
discuss the setting that results from having a probabilis-
tic Dolev-Yao attacker who is able to guess a key with a
given probability, and the related transition system. Gen-
erally speaking, the inference rules that an attacker can use
are weighed by the probability that their application will
be successful: the rules that characterise a classic Dolev-
Yao attacker are weighed by probability p = 1, while the
rules characterising a probabilistic Dolev-Yao attacker are
weighed by a probability p ≤ 1.
When protocol verifiers are required to prove the security
of a protocol, they either state that the protocol is safe or
they return a counter-example, i.e. the trace of an attack.
This is not enough to use these tools to fully-automatically
evaluate the probability of a protocol to be broken by an
attack, as this would require to explore a portion of the
execution tree of the possible attacks, which is larger than
the one explored just to give a counter-example (when a
counter-example is found, the search is simply stopped); ob-
viously these tools can be improved to do this, exploiting for
example the considerations in subsection 4.3.
In the next section an approach is proposed, in order to
use actual protocol verifiers to evaluate the probability of
an attack to succeed, giving in the worst case an upper and
a lower bound. This approach avoids the complexity that
underlies the quantitative considerations in [13], as the num-
ber of replications of processes is not limited by a polyno-
mial and the information on channel width is hidden in the
probabilistic assumptions on the strength of cryptographic
functions (see the next section 4). Moreover this approach
can easily be used to take into account all the extensions
proposed in [14, 15].
4. A STRATEGYTOEVALUATETHEPROB-
ABILITYOF SUCCESSFULATTACKSBY
MEANS OF PROTOCOL VERIFIERS
This work aims at relaxing the hypothesis underlying the
Dolev-Yao model: in particular we aim at reasoning in a
setting where the perfect cryptography assumption is weak-
ened.
To remove the hypothesis that cryptographic primitives
are perfect means that it is possible for a one-way function
to be inverted, thus revealing its argument.
If we are dealing with a sound cryptosystem, the prob-
ability of this to happen is negligible, though non-zero. It
is useful to evaluate this probability: a trivial application
is to estimate the security which is gained by using larger
keys. An evaluation of the strength of these functions im-
plicitly carries information about the channel width, which
the calculus proposed in [13] explicitly accounts for.
We can think of two extreme cases when having to violate
a cryptosystem: one option is a completely random guess,
the other is collecting enough data that can be used to break
cryptography. The general case is somewhere in between,
ranging between these extremes.
Protocol verifiers such as ProVerif apply inference rules
to derive terms from the data exchanged among the agents.
The hypothesis of perfect cryptography may be instantiated
in a protocol model by providing a constructor function,
but no destructor function: once a constructor function is
applied to some arguments it will not be possible to reverse
it and find their values.
This is the case for example of hashing functions: from the
cryptographic hash of a string it is not possible to recover
the original string.
In the case of public key cryptography the perfect cryp-
tography assumption is rendered as a couple of constructor-
destructor functions: the destructor function will return a
result only if the appropriate key is provided.
When testing the model of a safe protocol, the protocol
verifier will state that no attack on the protocol is possible.
Conversely if the protocol was not safe, the protocol verifier
will return the trace of a possible attack.
4.1 Introducing new destructors
Starting from a safe model of the protocol, what we are
aiming at is a suitable modification of the model, that ac-
counts for a possible break in the cryptography.
We do so by inserting new destructors: if the security
of the protocol was relying on the perfect cryptography as-
sumption, this will enable the protocol verifier to find an
attack on the protocol.
The naive destructors that can be added are the ones ac-
counting for random guesses: they simply behave as oracles
that invert the one-way function. For example we can pro-
vide the attacker with a destructor returning the key that
is used to encrypt a message, as well as providing him with
a destructor that recovers the plain text from an encrypted
message.
Finer destructors can be added, which take more than
one argument. For example this may be used to take into
account cryptoanalysis attacks: we can imagine a destructor
enabling the attacker to recover a key after having collected
a certain number of messages cyphered under that key. More
in general we can model different information leaks and add
destructor exploiting those leaks.
4.2 Examining the trace of the attack
We can think of these new destructors as functions that
can be used by paying a price, and the price is that the
probability of success of an attack is diminished accordingly
to the probability that the functions used to perform that
attack will return a correct value.
For example if an attack has been found and it does not
use those destructors, it will succeed with probability p = 1:
each inference rule which is applied gives a result with that
probability, so the product of all those probabilities is p = 1.
Conversely an attack which uses once only one of such
destructors will succeed with the probability that the de-
structor works properly: only one inference rule will succeed
with probability p ≤ 1, so the final probability of a successful
attack coincides with that value.
Obviously in the case that an attack needs to use more
destructors, its probability of success will be the probability
that all the destructors return a correct result.
4.3 Considerations on the most successful at-
tack
Unluckily once we have evaluated the probability for the
discovered attack to succeed, still we cannot trivially be sure
that there is not another attack that can succeed with a
higher probability. But at least it is possible to give upper
and lower bounds for the success probability, as well as an
upper bound to the number of times when the attacker will
have to rely on the new destructors.
The success probability p of breaking a protocol with the
most successful attack is greater or equal to the success prob-
ability pˆ of the discovered attack.
p ≥ pˆ
Similarly we can also see that the success probability p
cannot be greater than the probability pmed of the most
effective destructor to succeed, i.e. the one which most likely
will return a correct result: as the protocol was safe before
adding the new destructors, the most favourable situation
for the attacker is when he needs to apply once only the most
effective destructor, as the success probability of the attack
coincides with the success probability of the destructor.
p ≤ pmed
If this is not the case, we can at least estimate what the
maximum number of application of these destructors is: this
is the number of times that the most effective destructor can
be applied before the probability of success drops below the
success probability of the discovered attack.
These considerations can be used to guide the research for
a more successful attack.
5. AN EXAMPLE: USING PROVERIF TO
VERIFY THE YAHALOM PROTOCOL
To illustrate the propose methodology, we will reason about
the Yahalom protocol: the protocol verifier that will be used
is ProVerif. It comes along with some examples files, among
which there is a model of the Yahalom protocol (coded as
a sequence of Horn clauses), which will be modified to suit
our needs.
5.1 ProVerif
First of all a brief description of the tool used in this
example.
ProVerif is a protocol verifier written by Bruno Blanchet
[1, 7]. The tool processes input files formatted as a sequence
of Horn clauses or as a process in the applied pi-calculus
(a cryptographically-oriented variation of the pi-calculus),
which will be translated into Horn clauses before being run.
In particular, by means of ProVerif it is possible to ver-
ify secrecy properties, i.e. whether a Dolev-Yao attacker is
able to derive a term from the messages exchanged among
the agents: for example this can be used to prove the correct-
ness of a key agreement protocol, by proving that a term,
encrypted under the negotiated key and sent on a public
channel, is not derivable by an attacker. This is the way we
will use ProVerif to test the Yahalom protocol.
5.2 Protocol Description
During the protocol flow (see figure 2) a total of 4 messages
are exchanged among two agents, A and B, and a server, S.
Both agents share a key with the server and can generate
fresh nonces and keys. The server knows the identity of the
agents and its own identity is publicly known. One agent
knows the identity of the other agent (the one he wants to
send a message to), but not viceversa.
Here are the contents of the exchanged messages:
A → B the identity of A, together with a fresh nonce NA,
is sent to B;
B → S the identity of B and a triplet (made of a fresh
nonce NB, the nonce NA and the identity of A) en-
crypted under the key KBS is sent to S;
S → A the fresh keyKAB, the identity of B and the nonces
NA and NB, all encrypted under the key KAS , along
with the couple made by the identity of A and the key
KAB, encrypted under the key KBS , are sent to A;
A → B the couple made by the identity of A and the key
KAB, encrypted under the key KBS , and the nonce
NB, encrypted under the key KAB, are sent to B.
5.3 Adding Destructors to Break the Protocol
When analysing the protocol, ProVerif proves that it is
safe in the classical Dolev-Yao model.
Let us now weaken the model by providing the attacker
with some useful destructors, that will enable him to break
the protocol: ProVerif will find that the protocol is not safe
anymore.
The challenge for the adversary is to be able to decrypt
the first message MKAB , which is sent encrypted under the
fresh key KAB.
Figure 2: Message flow in the Yahalom protocol.
5.3.1 A Destructor to Guess the Key
As a first option we can imagine that the attacker can
guess the key K used to encrypt a message with probability
pG. If no other knowledge about the key is available, we
have that pG = 2
−`K , where `K is the length of the key K.
The attack is trivial:
• the attacker can decrypt the messageMKAB if he knows
KAB;
• the key KAB can be guessed with probability pG.
ProVerif gives the following attack trace instead:
• the attacker can decrypt the messageMKAB if he knows
KAB;
• the key KAB is sent from S to A in a message which
is encrypted under the key KAS ;
• the key KAS can be guessed with probability pG.
In both cases the probability of this attack to succeed is
therefore pG, as the new destructor is used only once.
5.3.2 A Destructor to Decrypt aMessage without Know-
ing the Key
As another option we can imagine that the attacker can
decrypt an encrypted message MK without knowing the key
K with probability pD. If no other knowledge about the
contents M of the message is available, we have that pD =
2−`M , where `M is the length of the plaintext of the message.
The attack is trivial and is the one found by ProVerif:
• the attacker can decrypt the messageMKAB with prob-
ability pD.
The probability of this attack to succeed is therefore pD,
as also in this case the new destructor is used only once.
5.3.3 A Destructor to Spoof the Server Identity
Yet another possible scenario is the one when the attacker
can successfully pretend to be the server: this means that he
is able to recreate the server authentication credentials. The
probability of being able to do this is pS . If no other knowl-
edge about the private key P used to generate the server
credentials is available, we have that pS = 2
−`P , where `P
is the length of the key P .
ProVerif gives the following attack trace:
• the attacker breaks the server credentials with proba-
bility pS ;
• the attacker can successfully mount a Man-in-the-Middle
attack.
The probability of this attack to succeed is therefore pS ,
as again the new destructor is used only once.
5.4 Considerations on the Attack Traces
The attack traces found by ProVerif show that the Ya-
halom protocol is not fully safe anymore if we weaken the
perfect encryption hypothesis, but it can be broken with
probability
p = max{pG, pD, pS}
If the attacker can use all of the three destructors de-
scribed above, instead of only one of them at once, ProVerif
will output a trace which is similar to one of the attacks
described above (actually the one using the message decryp-
tion without knowing the key), as in each one of them the
new destructor is used only once, so there can be no more
effective combination of using the destructors.
It must be noted that the trace given by ProVerif in this
case may not correspond to the trace of the most successful
attack — ProVerif knows nothing about probabilities, as this
is something that we add a posteriori.
It must also be noted that the traces given by ProVerif
are not always the most trivial ones.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper a methodology is presented, which allows
probabilistic reasoning on communications protocols, by means
of existing tools — provided that their output is an attack
trace, in the case that an attack is feasible.
The classic setting depicted in the Dolev-Yao model is ex-
tended to a broader one, where a probabilistic Dolev-Yao at-
tacker can perform actions that are not compatible with the
perfect cryptography assumption: these actions may succeed
with a given probability.
The advantage of this methodology is that it does not
require any modification to be apported to the tool used, as
all of the probabilistic reasoning is made on the output of
the tool that is used.
The disadvantage is that the output of the protocol verifier
is not always enough to find the most effective attack that
can be carried out on the protocol: ideally we would like
to have the protocol verifier to output the most effective
attack, but this cannot happen as the effectiveness of an
attack depends on the probabilistic assumptions that are
made and that therefore do not affect the analysis carried
out by the tool.
Nonetheless this is enough to determine an upper and a
lower bound for the probability of the protocol to be broken:
these bounds depend on the likelihood that the probabilistic
Dolev-Yao attacker may successfully perform the operations
that we entitle him to do, operations that a classic Dolev-
Yao attacker is not allowed to do.
Future work will be in the direction of integrating this
methodology in one of the available tools, by making it aware
of the weight of inference rules: by doing so the resolution
algorithm may be modified and applied to explore different
portions of the feasible attacks tree, in order to find the most
effective one.
7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The present work has emanated from research conducted
with the financial support of Science Foundation Ireland.
8. REFERENCES
[1] M. Abadi and B. Blanchet. Analyzing Security
Protocols with Secrecy Types and Logic Programs.
Journal of the ACM, 52(1):102–146, Jan. 2005.
[2] M. Abadi, B. Blanchet, and H. Comon-Lundh. Models
and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report.
In 21st International Conference on Computer Aided
Verification (CAV’09), Lecture Notes on Computer
Science, Grenoble, France, July 2009. Springer Verlag.
To appear.
[3] M. Abadi and C. Fournet. Mobile Values, New Names,
and Secure Communication. In POPL ’01:
Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
symposium on Principles of programming languages,
pages 104–115, New York, NY, USA, 2001. ACM.
[4] M. Abadi and A. D. Gordon. A Calculus for
Cryptographic Protocols: The spi calculus. In Fourth
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 36–47. ACM Press, 1997.
[5] M. Abadi and P. Rogaway. Reconciling Two Views of
Cryptography (the Computational Soundness of
Formal Encryption). J. Cryptology, 15(2):103–127,
2002.
[6] M. Baudet. Random Polynomial-time Attacks and
Dolev-Yao Models. Journal of Automata, Languages
and Combinatorics, 11(1):7–21, 2006.
[7] B. Blanchet. An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol
Verifier Based on Prolog Rules. In 14th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages
86–100, 2001.
[8] D. Dolev and A. C. Yao. On the Security of
Public-Key Protocols. IEEE Transaction on
Information Theory, 2(29):198–208, March 1983.
[9] O. Goldreich. Modern Cryptography, Probabilistic
Proofs, and Pseudorandomness. Springer-Verlag New
York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ, USA, 1998.
[10] G. Lowe. An Attack on the Needham-Schroeder
Public-Key Authentication Protocol. Inf. Process.
Lett., 56(3):131–133, 1995.
[11] G. Lowe. Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder
Public-Key Protocol using FDR. In TACAs ’96:
Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on
Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of
Systems, pages 147–166, London, UK, 1996.
Springer-Verlag.
[12] R. Milner. Communicating and Mobile Systems: the
Pi-Calculus. Cambridge University Press, June 1999.
[13] J. C. Mitchell, A. Ramanathan, A. Scedrov, and
V. Teague. A Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Calculus
for Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols. In Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 2001.
[14] R. Zunino and P. Degano. A Note on the Perfect
Encryption Assumption in a Process Calculus. In
FoSSaCS, pages 514–528, 2004.
[15] R. Zunino and P. Degano. Weakening the Perfect
Encryption Assumption in Dolev-Yao Adversaries.
Theor. Comput. Sci., 340(1):154–178, 2005.
